

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/01 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001101440016-1

DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCED

TACHED:

ER 85-2831


Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

ACIS - 344/85  
14 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Robert Linhard  
Acting Senior Director of Defense Programs  
and Arms Control, NSC Staff

FROM:   
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

STAT

SUBJECT: FY-87 Candidate Arms Control Impact Statements (U)

REFERENCE: Memo from ES/ACDA dated 2 August 1985

1. This memorandum responds to the request in the reference to advise the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of any comments about the subject list. (OUO)

2. I am responding on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence and CIA. The Intelligence Community has no comments on the list. If there is anything more we may do to assist you on this issue, please call and let me know. You can reach me on  (OUO)

STAT  
STAT

cc: Amb. H. Allen Holmes, STATE/PM  
Mr. William Staple, ACDA/EX Sec  
Mr. Frank Gaffney, OSD/ISP  
Dr. Torres, DOE  
RAdm Felt, JCS/J-5  
Mr. Sitrin, OMB

OFFICIAL USE ONLY



-134

ACIS - 344/85

SUBJECT: FY-87 Candidate Arms Control Impact Statements (U)

DDI/ACIS [ ] (14Aug85)

STAT

Original - Addressee

- 1 - Amb. H. Allen Holmes, STATE/PM
- 1 - Mr. William Staples, ACDA, EX Sec
- 1 - Mr. Frank Gaffney, OSD/ISP
- 1 - Dr. Torres, DOE
- 1 - RAdm Felt, JCS/J-5
- 1 - Mr. Sitrin, OMB
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ExDIR
- 1 - Exec/REG
- 1 - C/ACIS
- 1 - ACIS [ ]
- 1 - ACIS/Chrono

STAT

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt.				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/ACIS	X			
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks: For Direct response please

*[Handwritten signature]*

Executive Secretary

9 Aug 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

85- 2831

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTONOFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

August 2, 1985

## MEMORANDUM FOR:

Nicholas Platt,  
Executive Secretary, Department of State  
Colonel David Brown,  
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense  
William Vitale,  
Executive Secretary, Department of Energy  
William Martin,  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council  
[redacted] ✓  
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency  
BG George Joulwan,  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs  
of Staff  
Alton Keel,  
Associate Director for National Security and  
International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget

STAT

SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for FY 1987 Arms Control  
Impact Statements (ACIS)

The following list of FY 1987 Candidate ACIS topics is submitted  
for interagency consideration:

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Status</u>
Airborne Strategic Offensive Systems	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
ICBM Programs	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
SSBN/SLBM Programs	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
Space Defense	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
Chemical Warfare	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
Strategic Defense Initiative	Update of FY 1986 ACIS
Follow-on Forces Attack	New

The rationale and programs associated with each of these  
topics are included at TAB A.

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

-2-

Only one of the seven FY 1986 ACIS topics (Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles) is not proposed for updating. This topic, and the reasons for not updating it, is addressed at TAB B.

As in the past, your Agency's comments on FY 1987 ACIS Candidates should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with copies provided to the other departments and agencies which participate in the ACIS Inter-agency Working Group. Your response by August 16, 1985 would be appreciated. ACDA will need the resulting NSC decision on ACIS topics soon thereafter in order to begin the drafting.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W B Staples', is written over the typed name.

William B. Staples  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:  
As stated

AIRBORNE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS

This cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 11113F	B-52 Squadrons and Associated Procurement
DOE	B83 (Modern Strategic Bomb)
PE 64361F	Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Associated Procurement
DOE	W80-1 (ALCM Warhead)
PE 64738F	Protective Systems
PE 64226F	B-1B Bomber and Associated Procurement
PE 63234F	Common Strategic Rotary Launcher
PE 63364F	Short-Range Attack Missile II
DOE	Short-Range Attack Missile II Warhead

Airborne strategic offensive systems (ASOS) serve an important role as the air-breathing leg of the US strategic triad; their continuous modernization maintains the credibility of the US deterrent. The modernization and procurement of new strategic aircraft ensure the effectiveness of the US air-breathing forces against future Soviet air defenses, which are currently not limited by any arms control agreement.

Because these are interrelated programs that work together to produce intended effects, they are best assessed in a single ACIS. Analysis of this set of major programs is necessary to gain full understanding of their arms control implications, and to reflect developments in Soviet capabilities in this area.

With the delivery of the first operational B-1B to Dyess AFB, Texas, in July 1985, the B-1 program will move into a modernization cycle similar to that of the B-52. Important decisions will be made in 1985-1986 affecting the future of the manned penetrating bomber (whether to hold B-1 production to 100 aircraft, how fast to move on the Advanced Technology Bomber, the role of cruise missile carrier aircraft, etc). Although not as controversial as some program clusters, ASOS both as a member of the Triad and in its own right deserves the continued full treatment as a separate ACIS.

The FY 1987 Airborne Strategic Offensive Systems ACIS will review developments in technology, policy and program decisions, and will review the implications of these developments for the status of arms control.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ICBM Programs

This cluster includes the following program elements:

11213F	Minuteman Squadrons
DOE	W78 Minuteman Warhead
64312F	ICBM Modernization
DOE	W87 Peacekeeper Warhead
DOE	Small ICBM (SICBM) Warhead
63311F	Advanced Strategic Missile Systems (ASMS)

The land-based ICBM force continues to receive close attention from the Congress. Recent decisions limiting the numbers of Peacekeeper missiles to be procured and requiring specific amounts to be spent on the Small ICBM program emphasize congressional interests in this area. Concerns have been (and will, no doubt, continue to be) expressed about the dismantlement of a nuclear missile submarine instead of land-based ICBMs in order to comply with SALT II no-undercut policies. An FY 1987 ICBM ACIS would analyze these and other difficulties which may arise in the coming months regarding this important portion of US strategic force structure.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIEDSSBN/SLBM PROGRAMS

This cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 11221N	Fleet Ballistic Missile System
PE 11224N	SSBN Security Program
PE 11228N	TRIDENT Submarine, TRIDENT I Missile and Associated Procurement
PE 64363N	TRIDENT II (D-5) Missile and Associated Procurement
DOE	W76 TRIDENT I Warhead
DOE	W88 TRIDENT II Warhead
Procurement	UGM-73A (C-3) POSEIDON
Procurement	UGM-73A (C-3) POSEIDON Modification
PE 11402N	Navy Strategic Communications
PE 11401N	Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Communications and Associated Procurement
Procurement	E6A (TACAMO)
Procurement	UGM-96A (C-4) TRIDENT I
Procurement	TRIDENT Submarine
Procurement	TRIDENT II Missile

SSBNs, their weapons, and related security and communications systems together serve as a keystone of the US deterrent posture. They were regulated by the SALT I Agreement, and would likely be subject to limitations under a future START agreement. The continuing debate on future US strategic policy and systems, US adherence to SALT II warhead limits, and the ramifications of the US START policy would seem to require that the arms control implications of US sea-based strategic forces be assessed again for FY 1987. The FY 1987 SSBN ACIS would address the arms control implications of the dismantling of strategic missile submarines, the deployment of the D-5 missile and the launching of new TRIDENT submarines.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDSPACE DEFENSE

This cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 64406F	Space Defense Systems (Anti-satellite)
PE 63438F	Satellite Systems Survivability
PE 12424F	SPACETRACK and Associated Procurement
PE 12311F	NCMC - Space Defense Systems

The US and the USSR are growing increasingly dependent upon space systems for many important military functions. A number of other countries use satellites for civil or military purposes. The Soviets have an operational antisatellite (ASAT) capability which can threaten some of these satellites, and the US is developing its own ASAT capability. There is considerable pressure in the UN and the CD for an agreement to control arms in outer space and there is considerable Congressional interest in space arms control efforts.

Although overshadowed somewhat by the controversy over the SDI, discussions of the F-15/ASAT continue to be heard and the Congress continues to maintain a close watch on ASAT activities and funding. Any reduction in the current level of criticism can probably be attributed to a lack of testing resulting from technical difficulties, and can be expected to increase as the next test draws near. Continuing the expanded analysis of space defense systems is therefore important.

The Space Defense Systems Program effort involves four functional areas: Anti-satellite, Space Surveillance Technology, Satellite Systems Survivability, and Command and Control. Because they are interrelated program elements with a common goal, they are most usefully assessed in a single ACIS. Although there is some interdependence with the new Strategic Defense Initiative ACIS, the two topics are best considered as separate analyses with appropriate references to each other.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CHEMICAL WARFARE

This cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 62622A	Chemical and Small Munitions
PE 63615A	Lethal Chemical Munitions Concepts
Procurement	Chemical Retaliatory Capabilities (Munitions)
Procurement	Chemical Retaliatory Capabilities (Facilities)
Procurement	Army 155mm Chemical GB-2
Procurement	Navy BIGEYE Chemical Weapon

Only the primary DOD programs related to Chemical Warfare (CW) are listed.

It is US policy that chemical weapons arms control is to be pursued, and appropriate military capabilities are to be maintained, until such time as verifiable international agreements can be concluded which effectively remove existing and future threats of chemical warfare. Conclusion of an effective chemical weapons prohibition will not occur until the Soviets join us in trying to find effective solutions to the critical verification and compliance issues associated with a chemical weapons ban. Until agreement is achieved, active RDT&E of both deterrent retaliatory and defensive chemical warfare needs, and the initiation of the modernization of the deteriorating chemical retaliatory capability, are necessary for our defense and for deterrence of Soviet use of chemical weapons.

For the last several years the ACIS on DOD CW programs have shared the above conclusions concerning the arms control implications of the US chemical warfare effort. Until this year, though, production money has been disapproved by Congress. In June 1985 both houses of Congress voted to go ahead with the CW program, and it is expected that appropriations for this purpose will also be approved. The modernization of our CW stockpiles, the recent use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the continued proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World, and our own efforts to negotiate a CW treaty all point up the continued interest in and visibility of the subject. It seems clear that the CW ACIS should be updated.

UNCLASSIFIED

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

This new cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 63220C	SDI/Surveillance, Acquisition, and Tracking
PE 63221C	SDI/Directed Energy
DOE	SDI/Nuclear-Driven Directed Energy
PE 63222C	SDI/Conventional Weapons
PE 63223C	SDI/Systems Concept and Battle Management
PE 63224C	SDI/Support Programs

The Defense Technologies Study, its companion policy study, and the many other studies produced by opponents and proponents of the SDI have escalated the debate over strategic policy and arms control to a confrontation between the previously accepted strategic reliance upon deterrence alone and the President's vision of a transition to strategic defenses. Clearly, such a fundamental shift in the theory of nuclear strategy continues to have significant implications for arms control.

In particular, the apparent Soviet insistence that the US abandon the SDI as a precondition to any substantive negotiation in Geneva makes this program cluster especially important and requires expanded discussion in a separate ACIS. An added rationale involves the effect of SDI on the Allies and its possible interaction/competition with the French-sponsored Eureka research.

The FY 1987 Strategic Defense Initiative ACIS will reflect the relationship of these program elements to existing arms control agreements, the status of arms control discussions in various fora, and US policy and program decisions. Although there is some interdependence with the Space Defense ACIS, the two are best considered as separate analyses with appropriate references to each other.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDFollow-On Forces Attack Programs

This new cluster includes the following program elements:

PE 62303A	Missile Technology
PE 63306A	Terminally Guided Projectiles
PE 63313A	Missile/Rocket Components
PE 63303A	Surface-to-Surface Rocket System
PE 64321A	Joint Tactical Fusion Program
& 64321F	
PE 64324A	Joint Tactical Missile System-Army (JTACMS-A)
PE 64730A	Remotely Piloted Vehicles
PE 63725A	Remotely Piloted Vehicles-Advanced Development
PE 64770A	Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar
& 64770F	System (JSTARS) and associated procurement
PE 64742F	Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)
Procurement	Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Procurement	Area Denial Artillery Munition/Remote Anti-Armor Mine System (ADAM/RAAMS)

The Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) program supports United States implementation of the NATO Defense Planning Committee decision of November 1984 making FOFA with conventional weapons a mission for NATO forces. The program focuses on improving conventional capability to identify and carry out deep counterattacks against those Warsaw Pact forces that follow some distance behind leading elements in an offensive. This effort is in response to the continued numerical advantage of Warsaw Pact forces, their improved capability to mass and maneuver rapidly, and their continued upgrading of weapons, particularly conventional munitions on tactical ballistic missiles. Attack of follow-on forces will help to keep the force ratio at the forward edge of the battle area manageable.

Emerging technologies are providing our forces with radically new techniques and systems that will be able to locate and track fixed and moving targets deep inside hostile territory. Intelligence and fire-control information from multiple sources will be processed by intelligence fusion and automated systems and distributed to tactical commanders for targeting decisions. Targets will be engaged by delivery means that can deliver a variety of munitions, including terminally dispensed lethal submunitions. All the program elements of this cluster emphasize the use of new technologies for the purpose of either extended-range target acquisition or deep-attack capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

The Follow-On Force attack program cluster is likely to have positive arms control implications because the increased conventional capabilities that its implementation would give US forces could negate the numerical advantages of Warsaw Pact forces and make any conflict in Central Europe less likely. To be most effective, these or similar programs should also be adopted by our NATO allies in Central Europe. FOFA is already being debated there, and Congressional and public interest is increasing in the US. For these reasons, an ACIS on the Follow-On Force Attack cluster is recommended.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

This cluster includes the following program elements:

64353N	Vertical Launch System
64367N	TOMAHAWK and Associated Procurement
64370N	SSN 688 Class Vertical Launch System
DOE	W80 Mod-O Warhead
Procurement	Surface TOMAHAWK Support Equipment
Procurement	BGM-109 TOMAHAWK

An ACIS was submitted on SLCM programs for the FY 1986 Budget Cycle. Absent significant changes in the TOMAHAWK programs or in arms control policy or negotiating positions on SLCM, none of which are anticipated, ACDA proposes that this cluster be reported in Section I of the FY 1987 Abbreviated ACIS.

UNCLASSIFIED